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Abstract
This paper provided a theoretical framework for analyzing the relationship between federal
indemnification and livestock biosecurity. Theoretical results show that the responsiveness of
biosecurity to indemnity payments depends on a number of factors. First, the responsiveness
of biosecurity will depend on the effectiveness of preventive measures in decreasing the
growth in animal susceptibility. Second it was found that the responsiveness of disease
abatement to changes in an indemnity was an increasing function of the marginal product of
abatement. It was also found that abatement was a decreasing function of the rate at which
the marginal product diminishes and that the proportion of damages indemnified has a direct
affect on abatement. Lastly, it was shown that losses that extend beyond animals values may
decrease the impact of indemnification on abatement levels and under certain conditions the
level of biosecurity (with added losses)may exceed the no-indemnity optimal.
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In an effort to encourage livestock producers to report outbreaks of invasive and 
endemic diseases, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) provides incentives to producers for reporting infected 
animals for culling. During disease outbreaks, APHIS has compensated producers 
for the removal of diseased animals. The aim of this compensation is to keep 
pathogens out of the food supply and to control disease spread. Although the federal 
government is required by the U.S. Constitution to compensate individuals when 
private property is taken for public use, indemnities play an important role in 
encouraging producers to participate in government eradication programs (Ott, 
2006).  
 
Biosecurity describes the process and objective of managing biological risk 
associated with food and agriculture in a holistic manner. Biosecurity is often used 
in relation to sanitary, phytosanitary and zoosanitary measures applied in food and 
agriculture regulatory systems. It is a system of management procedures designed 
to reduce the risk of disease outbreaks on the farm, and the containment and 
management practices design to reduce the risk of disease spread (Smith et al., 
2003). Although biosecurity practices can decrease the probability of animal 
infection and disease spread, they are not without cost to producers.  
 
Federal indemnification programs may result in decreased biosecurity because 
indemnity payments implicitly create value for infected animals (Kuchler and 
Hamm, 2000). This raises concern because the purpose of these programs is to 
control the spread of animal disease and not to encourage behavior that would 
increase animal susceptibility. Past studies suggest that indemnity payments 
directly impact detection and reporting (ex post biosecurity); however, it is unclear 
if payments decrease producer willingness to implement biosecurity preventive 
measures (ex ante biosecurity). This paper provides a theoretical framework for 
analyzing the relationship between indemnity payments and the biosecurity 
preventive measures implemented by livestock producers. The theoretical construct 
in this paper provides the foundation for analyzing the impact of alternative 
government policies on biosecurity behavior. As policy makers evaluate the 
effectiveness and possible modification of indemnification and disease eradication 
programs, the potential moral hazard problem is of great concern.1  
 
                                                 
1 Given the focus of this study, ex ante biosecurity will simply be referred to as biosecurity. 
  12. Background 
 
In compensating producers the market value of euthanized animals, millions of 
dollars have been paid to livestock producers in indemnity payments (Grannis and 
Bruch, 2006). The objective of federal indemnification programs is to minimize the 
number of diseased animals in the food supply. Let D denote the total number of 
disease animals where  
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We expect that D is decreasing in the biosecurity input x and increasing in the 
disease probability θ. Let R denote the total number of disease animals reported to 
APHIS for culling where 
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We expect that R is increasing in D since an increase in the number of diseased 
animals should increase the number of animals reported to APHIS. R is also 
expected to be an increasing function of the indemnity payment i.   
 
The government’s objective is to set the indemnity payment such that (D – R) is 
minimized. It is the desire of the government to ensure optimal reporting by 
providing compensation for diseased animals. If the biosecurity input is also 
function of i, then the impact of the indemnity payment on the number of animals 
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Equation (3) indicates that the impact of indemnity payments on the number of 
animals reported is the results of two effects. The first term on the right hand side 
is the indirect effect of the indemnity payment (biosecurity effect). The second term 
is the direct effect of the indemnity payment. As suggested by Kuchler and Hamm 
(2000) the direct effect should be positive, that is the greater the compensation, the 
greater the number of infected animals reported to the USDA. If  , the 
indirect effect should also be positive since 
/ ∂∂ < xi0
/0 ∂ ∂> RD and /0 ∂ ∂< Dx . Intuitively 
we would expect that . Therefore the first term on the right hand side of 
equation (3) should be greater than or equal to zero. 
/ ∂∂ ≤ xi0
 
From equation (3) we see that the increase in the number of infected animals 
reported to the APHIS is due to the following: (1) more animals being reported 
because greater compensation increases the incentive for farmers to identify sick 
  2animals  (direct effect), and (2) greater compensation provides a disincentive 
for biosecurity spending, resulting in an increase in the total number of infected 
animals,   (indirect effect). This indirect effect is the 
potential moral hazard problem associated with indemnification. 
[/ ∂∂ Ri ]
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The literature on moral hazard and indemnification has primarily been in the 
area of crop insurance (Turvey, Hoy and Islam, 2002; Coble et al., 1997; Horowitz 
and Lichtenberg, 1993). Crop production is different from animal production in that 
target yields can be specified and compensation is given when events cause actual 
yields to fall below set targets. Specifying animal values are difficult because 
present values must account for potential offspring. Furthermore, identifying 
diseased animals often depends on the technology for disease diagnosis making it 
difficult to properly assess losses. 
  
Moral hazard is relatively less difficult to identify with insurance because there 
are two identifiable groups, the insured and uninsured. Production practices that 
differ between the two groups could be identified and moral hazard could be 
measured. Hoag, Thilmany and Koontz (2006) note that the U.S. is relatively 
inexperience in livestock insurance and that federal indemnification, as oppose to a 
federal guarantee on private insurance, is the chosen method of compensation for 
livestock disease loss. Given that all producers qualify for federal indemnification, 
group distinctions are not possible.  
 
3. Theoretical Models 
 
Kuchler and Hamm (2000) provides a theoretical approach for analyzing the impact 
of indemnity payments on the preventive measures employed by producers. 
Although the focus of their study was the impact of indemnity payments on 
detection and reporting, their theoretical model need only be modified slightly to 
account for preventive measures. 
  
Assume that there is a long-lived breeding stock (denoted Q) which is constant 
overtime with new animals added only as replacements for susceptible animals. Let 
 be the number of susceptible animals in the population, identified or not, during 
year t.   depends on the breeding practices of the farm and the rate of growth in   
is a function of biosecurity. Let the annual rate of growth in   be denoted as g. 
t S
t S t S
t S
() = g fx where x measures the level of biosecurity. Note that  ′ g <0, that is the 
growth in  t decreases with biosecurity. It is expected that biosecurity x is not 
exogenous but a function of biosecurity cost c and the relative indemnity payment p 
(the indemnity payment relative to the market price), where 
S
/0 ∂ ∂< xc . The sign 
and magnitude of ∂∂ xp  is the focus of this analysis. Let   be the number of 
animals found and replaced. Assume that the number of the susceptible animals are 
t F
  3found and replaced in fix proportions such that  = tt where f is a non-decreasing 
function of p. If the proportion of susceptible animals within the set of replacements 
is identical to the proportion of susceptible animals within the current population, 
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Taking the derivative of equation (4) with respect to p and solving for  results 
in the following: 
/ ∂∂ xp
 












pg Q p S
.                    (5) 
 
Note that 1 '0 , 1 , 0 − ≥≤ ∂ ∂ tt fS Q S p and ≥ . Thus, the term in brackets is positive. 
Given that g is decreasing in biosecurity (or at least non-increasing), equation (5) 
should be less than or equal to zero suggesting that biosecurity is decreasing in the 
relative indemnity payment. More importantly, note that as  0, / ′→∂∂ → − ∞ g xp  
and as  , ′−∞ ∂ ∂ → gx p 0 . With this model we get an important result. The 
biosecurity response to indemnity payments depends on the effectiveness of 
biosecurity in decreasing animal susceptibility. Therefore the greater the 
effectiveness of a preventive measure, the less likely a producer will discontinue the 
use of that measure with rising indemnity payments. This suggests that perceptions 
about preventive measures are important determinants of the responsiveness of 
biosecurity to indemnity payments. 
 
Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986) provide a theoretical framework for analyzing 
abatement inputs. Damage control agents in production or abatement inputs are 
unique in that they affect the potential output of the firm but may have no impact, 
or a negative impact, on actual output. Biosecurity inputs fall in this category 
because they impact output in the event of a disease outbreak; however, unlike 
productive inputs, biosecurity inputs are not necessarily output-increasing. Given a 
single measurable biosecurity input x, we can specify an abatement function G(x) 
which measures the proportion of the disease destructive capacity eliminated by the 
application of the biosecurity input. Note that [0,1] ∈ G , with G = 1 being complete 
eradication of destructive capacity and G = 0 being zero elimination or maximum 
destructive capacity. G is monotonically increasing and as . Given 
the relationship between actual and potential output, the production function for 
the firm is defined as 
,( ) →∞ → xG x 1
 
     [,() ] = Q FZGx .                (6) 
 
  4Q is actual output, Z is the productive input and F (.) has the standard properties of 
a production function. Actual output equals potential output only when  [, 1 ] = Q FZ  
and minimum actual output occurs when [, 0 ] = Q FZ .  
 
Assume a two-step procedure for profit maximization where the producer first 
determines the optimal level of abatement G. Given G, the firm then determines the 
optimal level of the biosecurity input x. From the profit maximization problem the 
impact of the indemnity payment on the level of abatement is derived. Let the 
proportion of damages paid to producers be δ , where  [0,1] δ ∈ . If losses are fully 
compensated then  1 = δ .  0 = δ  implies no compensation. The indemnity payment to 
a producer can be defined as 
  
   { } [, 1 ] [,() ] δ =− iP F ZP F Z G X .               (7) 
 
The indemnity payment is equal to a proportion of the value of potential output 
minus the value of actual output. Let r be the per-unit input cost and s the per-unit 
abatement cost, the profit maximization problem with and without the indemnity is 
specified as 
 
                     (8)  Π= − −
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                                    .  11 δδ Π= − + − −
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The first order conditions are respectively 
 
    = = ZG PF r PF s ,                   ( 9 )  
    1 δ = =− ZG PF r PF s ,/ ( ) . 
 
The marginal cost of abatement without the indemnity is s. With the indemnity, 
the marginal cost is /(1 ) δ − s . Note that (1 ) 1 δ − ≤⇒ /(1 ) δ − ≥ ss ; this indicates 
that the optimal level of abatement with the indemnity is at a higher marginal 
value product (lower level of abatement). As shown in Figure 1, the indemnity 
proportion decreases the optimal level of abatement from ′ G to . Without the 
indemnity, the firm will increase the level of abatement as long as the marginal 
value product of abatement is greater than the per-unit cost of abatement s. With 
the indemnity, the marginal value product must be at least greater than the sum of 
the per-unit cost of abatement and the marginal indemnity loss . The 
reason being is that a decrease in the number of infected animals decreases the 
indemnity payment received by a producer, thus making the indemnity loss an 
implicit cost of abatement. 
′′ G
(/ ) di dG
 
 
  5Taking the total differential of the first order condition (with the indemnity) 
yields 
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Solving for  / δ dG d yields 
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.              (12) 
 
Assuming that output is non-decreasing in abatement ( ) and that the 
sufficiency condition for a maximum holds (
0 ≥ G F
0 ≤ GG F ), equation (12) will be negative 
indicating that the level of abatement and the indemnity proportion are inversely 
related. Equation (12) shows that the responsiveness of abatement to changes in the 
indemnity proportion is an increasing function of the marginal product of 
abatement , a decreasing function of the rate at which the marginal product 
diminishes , and an increasing function of the indemnity proportion 
G F
GG F δ . Given 
that   decreases in G, lower levels of abatement correspond to higher marginal 
products. The fact that 
G F
/ δ dG d  increases in  G  suggests that the less abatement 
used by producers the more responsive those producers will be to the indemnity. 
 is the rate of change in . As  increases in absolute value, G becomes less 
responsive to changes in 
F
GG F G F GG F
δ . This is illustrated in Figure 2. Lastly, it is easily shown 
that as  1, / G δ δ →∂ ∂→ − ∞ . 
 
Potential losses beyond animal values could result in a sufficient level of 
biosecurity, even with government indemnification. Losses beyond animal values 
include the following: a decrease in the demand for the product due to reported 
disease outbreaks, damages to a producer’s reputation from selling infected 
animals, and the cost of damages that extend beyond animal values such as clean-
up cost and business interruption. Suppose that the selling price of an animal is a 
function of the level of abatement such that . It can be easily shown that the 
level of abatement will increase under these circumstances. If P is also a function of 
G then the first order condition can be restated as 
0 G P ≥
 
       () / ( 1 GG PF s PF ) δ = −− .             (13) 
  6 
Equation (13) shows that as long as there is a positive impact of abatement on 
prices, or a negative impact of non-abatement on prices, the optimal level of 
abatement will increase since () / ( 1 ) / ( 1 G sP F s ) δ δ − −< −(See  in Figure 1.). 
If
** G
δ s F PG > then the optimal level of abatement will be even greater than the 
optimal level without the indemnity (See  in Figure 1).  
* G
 
Taking the total differential of equation (13) yields 
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Solving for  / dG dδ  results in the following:  
 
(2 ) (1 )
G
G G GG GG
PF dG
dP F P F P δδ δ
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−+ −+ F
.          (15) 
 
The first and third terms in the denominator of equation (15) are due to P being a 
function of G. If these terms are zero, then equation (15) is identical to equation 
(12). The first term in the denominator of equation (15) is positive since 1 ≤ δ and P 
and  F  are increasing in G . If  (or at least not to negative), then the 
responsiveness of abatement levels to the indemnity proportion is relatively smaller 
in equation (15) when compared to equation (12). This is primarily due to the 
negative impact of non-abatement on the output price. 
0 GG P ≥
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper provided a theoretical framework for analyzing the relationship between 
federal indemnification and livestock biosecurity. During disease outbreaks, APHIS 
has compensated producers for the removal of diseased animals; however, this type 
of compensation could result in a decrease in biosecurity preventive measures. As 
policy makers evaluate the effectiveness of indemnification programs, this potential 
moral hazard problem is of great concern. 
 
Theoretical results show that the biosecurity response to indemnity payments 
depends on a number of factors. First, the responsiveness of the level of biosecurity 
will depend on the effectiveness of preventive measures in decreasing the growth in 
animal susceptibility. The greater the effectiveness of a preventive measure, the 
less likely a producer will discontinue the use of that measure with rising indemnity 
payments. Second, it was found that the responsiveness of abatement to changes in 
an indemnity was an increasing function of the marginal product of abatement. 
Therefore, producers with lower abatement levels should be more responsive to 
  7indemnity payments. It was also found that abatement responsiveness was a 
decreasing function of the rate at which the marginal product diminishes and that 
the proportion of damages indemnified had a direct affect on abatement 
responsiveness. Lastly, it was shown that losses that extend beyond animals values 
may decrease the impact of indemnification on abatement levels and under certain 






























  8Figure 2.  The Responsiveness of Abatement Given the Rate of Change in the 
Marginal Value Product 
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